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Abstract
This paper studies strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in the problem of fairly allocating
homogeneous indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We provide various extensions of strategy-
proofness to multi-valued solutions and examine their impact on standard solutions. We show that some
efficient and fair solutions, such as the envy-free solution, satisfy certain extensions of strategy-proofness.
We also establish an impossibility result on extended strategy-proofness that is defined in terms of expected
utility.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
We consider the problem of fairly allocating homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary
transfers are possible. A (multi-valued) solution is a correspondence which associates with each
preference profile a non-empty set of feasible allocations. Our purpose is to study the robustness
of multi-valued solutions to strategic manipulations.
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doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.07.001A central property on non-manipulability is strategy-proofness, which states that no one can
gain by misrepresenting his preferences (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975). In this context, it is
known that no efficient single-valued solution is strategy-proof (Green and Laffont, 1977;
Holmström, 1979; Schummer, 2000; Ohseto, 2000, 2004; Svensson and Larsson, 2002).
1
However, the definition of strategy-proofness is well-defined only for single-valued solutions.
Though we do not oppose the desirability of single-valuedness, this property is not weak. In fact,
many interesting solutions in this context are defined to be multi-valued. Thus there is room to
doubt that the impossibility results come from the underlying assumption of single-valuedness
rather than strategy-proofness itself. To examine this problem, we consider extended strategy-
proofness (henceforth, ESP) axioms that apply to multi-valued solutions as well as single-valued
solutions.
There is no single way to extend strategy-proofness to multi-valued solutions. Various ESP
axioms have been proposed so far in voting environments.
2 The ESP axioms do not have exactly
the same appeal as strategy-proofness. For example, they are not always related to dominant
strategy implementation unlike strategy-proofness. However, every ESP axiom do shares certain
important aspects of strategy-proofness and coincides with strategy-proofness under single-
valuedness. Thus checking the satisfaction of ESP axioms for each solution leads to a better
understanding of the robustness of the solution to strategic manipulations.
We prove both positive and negative results. They suggest that perfect non-manipulability is
impossible but partial non-manipulability is possible under multi-valuedness. One of the main
finding of this paper is that the envy-free solution satisfies an ESP axiom that says that, by
misrepresentation of preferences, an agent can add an allocation to the initial set of allocations
only if the allocation is worse than all originally chosen allocations. Since the envy-free
solution is efficient in our model (Svensson, 1983; Alkan et al., 1991), this result contrasts with
many impossibility results that show the incompatibility between strategy-proofness and some
fairness or efficiency notion. On the other hand, the envy-free solution is vulnerable to the
manipulation that excludes an undesirable part of the set of chosen allocations. The same
possibility and impossibility hold for the efficient and identical preferences lower bound
solution.
3 Also, the efficient and egalitarian equivalent solution only satisfies the weakest of
our ESP axioms that says that no one can manipulate the solution so that all allocations chosen
under manipulation are better than all allocations chosen under the truthful revelation of
preferences.
4 Finally, we also prove that no solution mentioned here satisfies an ESP axiom that
is based on expected utility on the uniform distribution over a chosen set.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces definitions. Section 3 provides ESP
axioms. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 provides discussions. Finally, Section 6
offers concluding remarks.
1Examples of strategy-proof but non-efficient single-valued solutions are Groves solutions (Groves, 1973; Ohseto, 2006)
and fixed-price core solutions (Miyagawa, 2001).
2See, for example, Pattanaik (1973, 1974), Dutta (1977), Kelly (1977), Gärdenfors (1976, 1979), Barberà (1977a,b),
Enelow (1979), and Feldman (1979a,b, 1980). Recent works along this line are Duggan and Schwartz (2000), Barberà
et al. (2001), and Ching and Zhou (2002). Klaus and Storcken (2002) study an ESP axiom in the economic problem of
choosing the location of a public facility.
3This solution associates with each preference profile the set of efficient allocations at which everyone weakly prefers his
own bundle to the bundle of the unique envy-free allocation in the hypothetical economy where all agents have the same
preferences as him.
4This solution associates with each preference profile the set of efficient allocations at which all agents are indifferent
between his own bundle to a common reference bundle.
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Let N≡{1, 2,…, n} be a finite set of agents. There are ℓ (1≤ℓ≤n−1) units of homogeneous
indivisible good,α.
5 Forconvenience,weconsiderthatany agent who receivesnoindivisible good
receives a “null” good, β. We allow monetary transfers among the agents. An allocation is a pair
xuðxiÞiaNuðrðiÞ;miÞiaNuðr;mÞ;
where σ: N→{α, β} is a function such that |σ
−1(α)|=ℓ and maRN is a vector such that P
iaN mi ¼ 0. Here σ(i) is the indivisible object that i receives and mi≥0( r e s p .mib0) is the
amount of money he receives (resp. pays). Let X be the set of allocations. Given σ,l e tN
α(σ)≡
{i∈N: σ(i)=α}a n dN
β(σ)≡{i∈N: σ(i)=β}.
Each agent i∈N has a valuation over the indivisible good, viaR. Then each i's quasi-linear
preference over the consumption space fa;bg R is represented by, for each miaR,
uiða;miÞuvi þ mi;
uiðb;miÞumi:
A profile of valuations is vuðv1;v2;…;vnÞaRN.G i v e nap r o f i l evaRN,l e tv ¯∈{v1, v2,…, vn}
be the ℓ-th highest number among v1, v2,…, vn.S i m i l a r l y ,l e tv
¯
be the (ℓ+1)-th highest number
among v1, v2,…, vn. For example, when v1≥v2≥⋯≥vn, v ¯=vℓ and v
¯
=vℓ+1.
A solution is a correspondence from RN to X which associates with each profile vaRN a non-
empty set of allocations, ψ(v)⊆X. Given two solutions ψ and ϕ, we write ψϕ to denote the
intersection of ψ and ϕ. That is, for each vaRN,ψϕ (v)≡ψ(v)∩ϕ(v). Also, we write ψ⊆ϕ if, for
each vaRN, ψ(v)⊆ϕ(v), and write ψ⊊ϕ if ψ⊆ϕ and for some vaRN,ψ(v)⊊ϕ(v). Given
iaN;wiðvÞufxiafa;bg R : xawðvÞg is the restriction of ψ(v)o ni.
We first define a familiar efficiency solution:
The (Pareto-)efficient solution, P: An allocation x∈X is efficient for vaRN if there exists no
y∈X such that for each i∈N, ui(yi)≥ui(xi ) and for some j∈N, uj (yj )Nuj (xj ). Let P(v) be the
set of efficient allocations for v.








We first define a central non-manipulability axiom that is well-defined only for single-valued
solutions. It states that no one can gain by preference misrepresentation:
Strategy-proofness: A solution ψ satisfies strategy-proofness if there exist no vaRN, i∈N and
viV aR such that
uiðwiðviV ;v−iÞÞNuiðwiðvÞÞ:
5This economy is studied by Tadenuma and Thomson (1991). A special case with only one object (i.e., ℓ=1) is
intensively analyzed by Tadenuma and Thomson (1993, 1995). We refer to Thomson (2004) for a survey.
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ness. Hereafter we restrict our attention to compact-valued solutions, that is, solutions such that
ψ(v) is compact for each vaRN. When we say that a solution ψ satisfies an ESP axiom, the
solution is supposed to be compact-valued. This is just to avoid some technical problems such as
the lack of maximum or minimum and to simplify definitions of ESP axioms.
6 All standard “fair”
solutions studied in this paper and in the literature are compact-valued.
7
To define ESP axioms, it is often useful to consider preferences over sets of allocations. Since
we restrict our attention to compact-valued solutions, it suffices to extend preferences to compact
sets of allocations. Let
XufAa2X ⧹fFg : A is compactg
be the set of all non-empty compact sets of allocations. For each i∈N, we denote by ≻ui a strict
preference on X that is defined by ui. We do not deal with its indifference part, since it is not
necessary in order to define ESP axioms.
3.2. Minimum and maximum
The following axiom is studied by Nehring (2000) under the name of “generalized strategy-
proofness”.
8 As he says, this axiom is at the edge of possibility: if it is weakened, the strategy-
proofness interpretation is lost.
Separation-ESP: Given ui, let ≻ui











The next axiom is based on the maximin criterion.
9
Min-ESP: Given ui, let ≻ui
min be such that, for each A;BaX,
Admin









6For example, under the compactness assumption, the maximum and minimum of utilities over the set of consumption
bundles exist. Also, the uniform distribution on any compact set of allocations is well-defined. This also enables us to
state notation and definitions in a much simpler way. For example, when ψ is compact-valued, we can write “maxx∈ψ(v)
ui(x)bmaxy∈ψ(v′) ui(y)” instead of “for each x∈ψ(v), there exists y∈ψ(v′) such that ui(xi)bui(yi)”. This facilitates the
understanding of the discussion since the definitions of ESP axioms are relatively complicated.
7However, one can handle non compact-valued solutions in a similar way.
8He shows that this condition is necessary for solutions to be implemented in Nash equilibrium in voting environments.
9Strategic manipulation based on the maximin criterion is analyzed by Pattanaik (1973), Dutta (1977), and Thomson
(1979).
56 O. Bochet, T. Sakai / Mathematical Social Sciences 53 (2007) 53–68The next condition, which is based on the maximax criterion, is introduced by Jackson
(1992).
10
Max-ESP: Given ui, let ≻ui
max be such that, for each A;BaX,
Admax









3.3. No addition and deletion
Ching and Zhou (2002) introduce two ESP axioms, each of which implies max-ESP and min-




the allocation is better than all allocations chosen under the manipulation.





Any ψ satisfying no-addition-ESP is robust to the strategic enlargement of the set of chosen
allocations. We say that an agent i can enlargement-manipulate ψ at vaRN if there exists viV aR
such that ψ(v)⊊ψ(vi′, v− i) and for each x∈ψ(vi′, v− i)\ψ(v) and each y∈ψ(v), ui(xi)Nui(yi). If ψ
satisfies no-addition-ESP, then there are no i∈N and vaRN such that i can enlargement-
manipulate ψ at v.
No-deletion-ESP: There exist no vaRN, I∈N, and viV aRN such that there exists x∈ψ(v)\ψ




Any ψ satisfying no-deletion-ESP is robust to the strategic reduction of the set of chosen
allocations. We say that an agent i∈N can reduction-manipulate ψ at vaRN if there exists viV aR
such that ψ(vi′, v− i)⊊ψ(v) and for each x∈ψ(v)\ψ(vi′, v− i) and each y∈ψ(vi′, v− i), ui(yi)Nui
(xi). If ψ satisfies no-deletion-ESP, then there are no i∈N and iaRN such that i can reduction-
manipulate ψ at v.
3.4. Expected utility
Given vaRN, since ψ(v) is the set of best allocations in views of ψ, whenever ψ is applied, it is
natural to consider that all allocations in ψ(v) are equally desirable. Then it makes sense to use the
10He derives this condition as a necessary condition for multi-valued solutions to be implemented in undominated
strategies using bounded mechanisms.
57 O. Bochet, T. Sakai / Mathematical Social Sciences 53 (2007) 53–68uniform distribution over ψ(v) to select one final allocation from this set. This idea justifies the
following ESP axiom for the case when agents evaluate sets of allocations by expected utility:
11
Expected-utility-ESP: Given ui and AaX, let Eðui : AÞ be the expected utility of ui at A with





A solution ψ satisfies expected-utility-ESP if there exist no vaRN, i∈N,a n dviVaR such that
Eðui : wðviV ;v−iÞÞNEðui : wðvÞÞ:
Since expected-utility-ESP only depends on the average of utilities over allocations, it implies
none of the ESP axioms defined so far except for separation-ESP. Expected-utility-ESP is
introduced by Feldman (1979a, 1980) in voting environments.
12 Feldman (1979a, 1980) and
Barberà, Dutta, and Sen (2001) study this axiom and obtain certain dictatorship results in voting
environments. Gärdenfors (1979) analyzes relations between preferences on sets and expected
utility functions when distributions over the set of chosen allocations are unknown.




4. Manipulability of fair solutions
4.1. Envy-freeness
A central fairness concept in the theory of fair allocation is envy-freeness (Foley, 1967). It
states that everyone should weakly prefer his own consumption bundle to anyone else's at any
chosen allocation.
The envy-free solution, F: An allocation x∈X is envy-free for vaRN if for each i, j∈N, ui
(xi )≥ui(xj). Let F(v) be the set of envy-free allocations for v.
It is known that for each vaRN, F(v)≠∅(Alkan et al., 1991, Theorem 2).
13 In this context, all
envy-free allocations are efficient (Svensson, 1983, Theorem 2). This relation much strengthens
the appeal of the envy-free solution. The next lemma is useful to understand the structure of this
solution:
Lemma 2. For each vaRN,( σ, m)∈F(v) if and only if
(i) for each i, j∈N
α(σ), mi=mj,
(ii) for each i, j∈N
β(σ), mi=mj,


















11Note that the uniform distribution on ψ(v) is well-defined since this set is compact.
12Definition 7 in Feldman (1979a) and “non-manipulability” in Feldman (1980) correspond to this.
13In our simpler setting, the existence of envy-free allocations can be derived as a corollary to our Lemma 2.
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n vkNmk, then agent k envies agent h.I fmkN−n−S
n vh, then









Conversely, let (σ, m)∈X satisfy (i)–(iii). Let i, j∈N.I fe i t h e ri, j∈N
α(σ)o ri, j∈N
β(σ), then
by (i) and (ii), ui(xi)=ui(xj). Hence, suppose that i∈N
α(σ)a n dj∈N
β(σ). When k∈arg mini∈N α(σ)













zujða;miÞ.T h e r e f o r e ,( σ, m)∈
F(v). □





(resp. v ¯). This fact suggests that no agent who receives α can manipulate the
envy-free solution in such a way that his best envy-free allocation is improved. Also, it suggests
that enlarging the set of envy-free allocations in a favored way is impossible.
Proposition 1. F satisfies no-addition-ESP.
Proof. Let vaRN. We only consider the simple case that v has no tie: for each i, j∈N, vi≠vj. The
case with tie can be handled in the same way as non-tie cases, but only dealing with the non-tie
case suffices to understand the essence of the proof.
Without loss of generality, assume that v1bv2b⋯bvn. Let j∈N. We assume that vj≥vn−ℓ+1
(i.e., vj≥v ¯). The other case can be handled in a parallel way. Let vj′≠vj. Note that







     
and minxaFðvÞujðxjÞzS
nvn−S þ1.
Case (i) vjNvn−ℓ+1 (i.e., jNn−ℓ+1):
Subcase (i-i) vn−ℓ+1≤vj′: Then, Fj(v)=Fj(vj′, v− j).
Subcase (i-ii): vn−ℓbvj′bvn−ℓ+1: In this subcase, Fj(vj′, v− j)⊊Fj(v).








     
:
Hence, FjðvjV;v−jÞ⧹ FjðvÞ¼ b;S
nvn−S










we obtain the desired result.
Subcase (i-iv) vj′bvn−ℓbvn−ℓ+1: In this case, for each (σ, m)∈F(vj′, v− j),
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Subcase (ii-i) vjbvj′≤vj+1: Then,







     
:




Subcase (ii-ii) vn− ℓbvj′bvj: In this case, Fj(vj′, v− j)⊊Fj(v).
Subcase (ii-iii) vn− ℓ=vj′: The same argument as (i-iii) holds, so we omit the proof.
Subcase (ii-iv) vj′bvn− ℓ: The same argument as (i-iv) holds, so we omit the proof. □
Proposition 1 contrasts with many impossibility results in this literature. In particular, it is
known that, when there are two agents, the class of single-valued and strategy-proof solutions can
be characterized by certain forms of constancy or dictatorship (Schummer, 2000, Theorem 1).
14
Also, when there is only one real object, even on finitely restricted domains, there is no single-
valued subsolution of the efficient solution satisfying strategy-proofness and equal compensation
(Ohseto, 2000, Theorem 1).
15 The envy-free solution is a subsolution of the efficient solution that
satisfiesequal compensationanddonotexhibitanyconstancyordictatorship. Hence,ourtheorem
implies that we can somewhat escape Schummer and Ohseto's impossibility results if we allow
solutions to be multi-valued and extend strategy-proofness to no-addition-ESP. However, the
envy-free solution escapes some but not all form of manipulation: the next proposition is negative
and shows that the envy-free solution is almost always vulnerable to reduction–manipulation.
Proposition 2. For each vaRN, F is reduction–manipulable at v if and only if v ¯Nv
¯
.
Proof. Let vaRN.I fv ¯Nv
¯
, then by Lemma 2, any i∈N can reduction-manipulate F by reporting
vi′ with v ¯Nvi′Nv
¯
. Also, if v ¯=v
¯
, then by Lemma 2, F(v) is essentially singleton and no i∈N can
reduction-manipulate here. □
4.2. Identical preferences lower bound
The notion of the identical preferences lower bound states that everyone should benefit from
the diversity of preferences (Moulin, 1990). Given viaR, let r(vi)∈X be such that for each j∈N,
ui(ri(vi))=ui(rj(vi)). This is an allocation that treats everyone symmetrically when all agents have
the same preference as i. Note that such an r(vi) is essentially unique in that if r(vi) and r′(vi) are
two such reference allocations, ui(ri(vi))=ui(ri ′(vi)). Slightly abusing notation, we deal with r(vi)
as if it were a consumption bundle.
Identical preferences lower bound solution, B: For each vaRN, let B(v)≡{x∈X: For each
i∈N, ui(xi)≥ui(r(vi))}.
It is known that if n=2, then F=B, and if nN2, then F⊊B (Moulin, 1990, p152; Beviá, 1996,
Propositions 1 and 2). The following is a characterization of reference bundles for the identical
preferences' lower bound.
14His theorem deals with the two-agents and two-objects case, while we deal with the case where the number of objects
is smaller than the number of agents. However, in the two-agent case, these two cases are equivalent, since our α and β
can be regarded as two different indivisible objects.
15Equal compensation: For each vaRN and each (σ, m)∈ψ(v), if i, j∈N are such that σ(i)=σ( j)=β, then mi=mj.
Ohseto (1999) also studies this axiom together with strategy-proofness.
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n vi) (or, alternately, (b; S
nvi)).
Proof. Since the set of symmetric allocations for (vi, vi,…, vi) coincides with the set of envy-free
allocations F (vi, vi,…, vi), this immediately follows from Lemma 2. □
Lemma 3 implies the following characterizations of PBi(v):







Then, for each i∈N,
(i) if viNv ¯ or vi=v ¯Nv
¯
, then



































































=v ¯, then PBi(v) is the union of the two sets in (i) and (ii).
We provide a slightly weaker version of no-addition-ESP. It states that, at every true pre-
ference profile, when an agent manipulates a solution, the welfare level he achieves is lower than
all achievable welfare levels under the true preference profile.
Weakno-addition-ESP: There are no vaRN, i∈N, and viV aR such that for some y∈ψ(vi′, v− i)\
ψ(v) with uiðyiÞgfuiðziÞaR : zawðvÞg, ui(yi)Nminx∈ψ(v)ui(xi).
Note that in the definition of no-addition-ESP, the term “uiðyiÞgfuiðziÞaR : zawðvÞg” does
not appear. This is the only difference between no-addition-ESP and weak no-addition-ESP.
However, since agents are only concerned with welfare levels, we consider that this relaxation
does not lose the essence of no-addition-ESP.
Proposition 3. If n=2,then PB satisfies no-addition-ESP. If n≥3, then PB does not satisfy no-
addition-ESP, but it satisfies weak no-addition-ESP.
Proof.I fn=2, PB coincides with F (Beviá, 1996, Proposition 1), hence by Proposition 1, F
satisfies no-addition-ESP.
Assume n≥3. Since lbn, at least one of l≥2o rn−ℓ≥2 holds. We only prove the case
ℓ≥2. The other case can be proved in a parallel way.










16There may be multiple such σ. However, the result is independent of the choice of σ.









There exists y≡(σ, m)∈PB(v1 ′, v−1) with




















Since y∉PB(v), it suffices to show that u1(x1)bu1(y1).



























bn−S together imply the third inequality of Eq. (1). Thus u1
(x1)bu1(y1) holds.
For the second part of the claim, we only show that in the above counterexample, there exists
z1∈PB1(v) such that u1(z1)=u1(y1), so the existence of y1 does not lead to the violation of weak
no-addition-ESP. A formal proof can be easily obtained by applying the same argument, so we




By a routine calculation, u1(y1)bu1(w1). Thus, u1(x1)bu1(y1)bu1(w1). Hence, there exists






such that u1(y1)=u1(α, m1 ′). Since z1≡(α, m1 ′)∈PB1(v), this completes
the proof. □
It is easy to see that, if ψ satisfies weak no-addition-ESP,t h e ni ti senlargement-non-
manipulable at all vaRN. Thus Proposition 3 implies that PB s a t i s f i e st h i sn o n - m a n i p u -
lability condition. On the other hand, for reduction–manipulation, the same impossibility as
F holds:
Proposition 4. For each vaRN, PB is reduction-manipulable at v if and only if v ¯Nv
¯
.
Proof. This can be easily shown using Lemma 4. □
We next provide a strong impossibility result. It establishes the non-existence of ψ⊆PB
satisfying expected-utility-ESP.
Proposition 5. There exists no solution ψ⊆PB satisfying expected-utility-ESP.









Claim 1. For each iVℓ ;Eð ðui : ψ ψð ðvÞ ÞÞ Þ≥1. Let i≤ℓ. Note vi=1. It suffices to show that for
arbitrary small εN0,
Eðui : wðvÞÞz1−e: ð2Þ
Let εN0 and vi′≡ε.
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Eðui : wðvÞÞzEðui : wðviV;v−iÞÞ: ð3Þ
By definition,




















Since Eq. (8) holds for arbitrary chosen x′∈ψ(vi′,v − i), we have Eq. (5). Thus, by Eqs. (3), (4),
and (5), we have Eq. (2). Since Eq. (2) was proven for arbitrary small εN0, the claim is now
established.
Claim 2. Some i≥ℓ+1 can manipulate. Note that, when f is the uniform distribution on ψ(v),
X
iaN















f ðxÞS dx ¼ S
Z
xawðvÞ
f ðxÞdx ¼ S :
Therefore, by Claim 1, there exists i≥ℓ+1 such that Eðui : wðvÞÞV0. We claim that i can





ðrV ;mV ÞaPBðviV ;v−iÞ
miVV min
ðrV ;mV ÞawðviV ;v−iÞ
miV
¼ min
ðrV ;mV ÞawðviV ;v−iÞ
uiðb;miV ÞV Eðui : wðviV;v−iÞÞ:
This contradicts expected-utility-ESP. □
Since F⊆PB, Proposition 5 implies that no ψ⊆F satisfies expected-utility-ESP.
4.3. Egalitarian equivalence
The notion of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978) states that each agent
should receive a consumption bundle that is indifferent to a common “reference” consumption
bundle. Given vaRN, an allocation x is α-egalitarian equivalent for v if there exists m⁎
aaR such
that for each i∈N, ui(xi)=ui(α, mα *). Let E
α(v) be the set of α-egalitarian equivalent allocations
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baR such that for each i∈N,
ui(xi)=ui(α, mα *). Let E
α(v) be the set of β-egalitarian equivalent allocations for v.
Egalitarian-equivalent solution, E: For each vaRN, let E(v)≡E
α(v)⋃E
β(v) be the set of
egalitarian equivalent allocations.
The following is a characterization of the set of α-egalitarian-equivalent allocations:
Lemma 5. For each vaRN, (σ,m )∈E










n for each iaNbðrÞ:
Proof. We only prove the only if part, since the other part is straightforward. Let (σ, m)∈E
α(v).
Without loss of generality, assume that N
β(σ)={1, 2,…, n−ℓ}. Since (σ, m)∈E
α(v), all agents in
N
α(σ) receive the same amount of money, caR. For each i∈N
β(σ), since ui(α, c)=ui(β, mi), we
have that mi−vi=c. Note that for each i, j∈N







vi þð n−S Þc:
By budget balancedness, ðn−S Þc þ
Pn−S







This lemma implies that any α-egalitarian equivalent allocation is characterized by valuations
of agents who receive β. Thus, whenever the set N
β(σ) is unchanged, any agent i∈N
β(σ) can
increase his money by reporting vi′Nvi. This fact underlines the main difficulty with egalitarian-
equivalent solutions concerning the satisfaction of ESP axioms.
Since α-egalitarian equivalence and β-egalitarian equivalence are symmetric, the character-
ization of β-egalitarian equivalent allocations is also obtained in a similar fashion:
Lemma 6. For each vaRN,( σ, m)∈E
β(v) if and only if









n for each iaNbðrÞ:
Proposition 6. PE
α and PE
β do not satisfy separation-ESP; PE satisfies separation-ESP, but not
min-ESP, max-ESP, and expected-utility-ESP.
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i∈N, and vi′≠vi. We assume that vi≥v
¯










Let x≡(σ, m) be the efficient and α-egalitarian equivalent allocation for v with σ(i)=α. Note
that x∈PE(v). We shall show that there is y∈PE(vi′, v− i) such that ui(xi)≥ui(yi).
If vi′≥v
¯
, then x∈PE(vi′, v− i). Hence, let y≡x in this case. Suppose that vi′bv
¯
. Let v′≡(vi′,
v− i). Let y≡(σ′, m′) be the efficient and α-egalitarian equivalent allocation for v′ with
yi ¼ b;viV−
P







































The only positive result we obtained is that PE satisfies separation-ESP, which is the weakest
extension of strategy-proofness. Thus Proposition 6 is rather negative.
5. Discussion
5.1. Other ESP axioms
There are many other ESP axioms in the literature. We refer to Gärdenfors (1979), Feldman
(1979a,b), and Klaus and Storcken (2002) for the interested reader. We here only mention an ESP
axiom whose flavor is quite different from ours. The axiom is studied by Tadenuma and Thomson
(1995) in economies with indivisibilities. It states that there exists no vaRN such that for each




Let us call this axiom point-wise-ESP. In the definition of point-wise-ESP, manipulation is
considered for each point in ψ(v) and manipulators can be different at every point. Thus, the idea
65 O. Bochet, T. Sakai / Mathematical Social Sciences 53 (2007) 53–68of point-wise-ESP is based on the manipulation of an allocation in a chosen set rather than the set
itself, unlike our ESP axioms.
Tadenuma and Thomson (1995, Theorem 1) show that, when there is only one indivisible
good, no ψ⊆F satisfies point-wise-ESP. By a proof similar to the proof of Proposition 5, one can
easily show that no ψ⊆PB satisfies point-wise-ESP. This generalizes Tadenuma and Thomson's
result by allowing several indivisible objects to exist and extending F to PB.
5.2. Stochastic choice
In voting environments, Gibbard (1977) considers single-valued solutions that select a
probability distribution over the set of alternatives.
17 This stochastic approach is quite different
from our approach that selects a set of deterministic alternatives (allocations). However, when we
compare sets taking into account probability distributions, there is no big difference between the
two. We here restrict our attention to uniform distributions.
18
Let
Fuf f : aAaX;f is the uniform distribution over Ag
be the set of uniform distributions whose supports belong to X. Given f aF, let
supp f ufxaX : f ðxÞN0g
be the support of f.Astochastic solution is a function h from RN to F. We assume that each agent
evaluates every f aF by expected utility. A stochastic solution is stochastically strategy-proof if







Given a stochastic solution h, define the solution w
h : RNYX as ψ
h(v)≡supph(v) for each
vaRN. Then it is easy to see that ψ
h satisfies expected-utility-ESP if and only if h satisfies
stochastic strategy-proofness. Therefore, Proposition 5 implies that there exists no stochastic
solution h that satisfies stochastic strategy-proofness, “ex-post efficiency” (8vaRN, supph
(v)⊆P(v)), and the “ex-post identical preferences lower bound” ( 8vaRN, supph(v)⊆B(v)).
19
5.3. Implementability and ESP axioms
Nehring (2000) shows that Maskin's (1999) monotonicity condition for Nash implementation
implies separation-ESP in voting environments.
20 It is unknown if the same implication holds in
our environment. As far as we know, all solutions satisfying the monotonicity condition, such as
F or PB, also satisfy separation-ESP.
21
Jackson(1992)shows that max-ESP is necessary for implementation in undominated strategies
using “bounded mechanism” in general environments. We observed that F and PB satisfy max-
17We refer to Barberà, Dutta, and Sen (2001) and Dutta, Peters, and Sen (2006) for recent developments on this topic.
18This approach is taken by Feldman (1980).
19These “ex-post” axioms ensure that the finally selected allocation is always normatively appealing by restricting the
support of a chosen distribution. We do not know what happens if we consider “ex-post” versions of the axioms here.
20This result is originally shown by Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) under single-valuedness. Nehring generalizes the
result for multi-valued solutions.
21Ohseto (2004) obtains impossibility results on Nash implementation of subsolutions of E.
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“bounded mechanism”.
5.4. Summary of results
The next table summarizes which main solutions satisfy which ESP axioms:
Table: satisfaction of ESP axioms
ESP\solutions PE
α, PE
β PE F PB
Separation − ++ +
Min −− − −
Max −− ++
Weak no-addition −− ++
No-addition −− + −
No-deletion −− − −
Expected-utility −− − −
6. Conclusion
We studied strategic manipulations of (multi-valued) solutions in economies with homo-
geneous indivisible objects and monetary transfers. By examining the satisfaction of ESP axioms,
we investigated how strategically manipulable solutions are and which types of manipulations
occur. For example, we showed that the envy-free solution is robust to the manipulation that adds
a better allocation to the set of chosen allocations, but it is vulnerable to the manipulation that
deletes a worse allocation from the set of chosen allocations. Providing both positive and negative
results is important here, since understanding what is behind a positive result passes through what
cannot be done. This also enables us to compare the degree of manipulation across solutions. For
instance, given our results, it is fair to say that the egalitarian-equivalent solution is more
manipulable than the envy-free solution.
Acknowledgement
We thank the Associate editor and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments. The
first version was written while T. Sakai was visiting the University of Namur. He gratefully
acknowledges the hospitality of the school.
References
Alkan,A.,Demange,G.,Gale,D.,1991.Fairallocationofindivisiblegoodsandcriteriaofjustice.Econometrica59,1023–1039.
Barberà, S., 1977a. Manipulation of social decision functions. Journal of Economic Theory 15, 266–278.
Barberà,S., 1977b. The manipulation of social choice mechanisms that do not leave too much to chance. Econometrica 45,
1573–1588.
Barberà, S., Dutta, B., Sen, A., 2001. Strategy-proof social choice correspondences. Journal of Economic Theory 101,
374–394.
Beviá, C., 1996. Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods. Social
Choice and Welfare 13, 113–126.
Ching, S., Zhou, L., 2002. Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules. Social Choice and Welfare 19, 569–580.
Duggan, J., Schwartz, T., 2000. Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard–Sattherthwaite
generalized. Social Choice and Welfare 17, 85–93.
67 O. Bochet, T. Sakai / Mathematical Social Sciences 53 (2007) 53–68Dutta, B., 1977. Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group
decision rules. Journal of Economic Theory 15, 99–111.
Dutta, B., Peters, H., Sen, A., in press. Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes. Social Choice and Welfare.
Enelow,J.M.,1979.Strategicmanipulationandtheuseofindividualdecisionrules.JournalofEconomicTheory21,353–356.
Feldman, A., 1979a. Manipulation and the Pareto rule. Journal of Economic Theory 21, 473–482.
Feldman, A., 1979b. Nonmanipulable multi-valued social decision functions. Public Choice 34, 177–188.
Feldman, A., 1980. Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice rules. Public Choice 35, 503–509.
Foley, D., 1967. Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Economic Essays 7, 45–98.
Gärdenfors, P., 1976. Manipulation of social choice functions. Journal of Economic Theory 13, 217–228.
Gärdenfors, P., 1979. On definitions of manipulation of social choice functions. In: Laffont, J.-J. (Ed.), Aggregation and
Revealed Preferences. North-Holland Publishing Company.
Gibbard, A., 1973. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica 41, 587–601.
Gibbard, A., 1977. Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance. Econometrica 45, 665–681.
Green, J., Laffont, J.-J., 1977. Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public
goods. Econometrica 45, 727–738.
Groves, T., 1973. Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41, 617–631.
Holmström, B., 1979. Groves' scheme on restricted domains. Econometrica 47, 1137–1144.
Jackson, M.O., 1992. Implementation in bounded strategies: a look at bounded mechanisms. Review of Economic Studies
59, 757–775.
Kelly, J.S., 1977. Strategy-proofness and social choice functions without single-valuedness. Econometrica 45, 439–446.
Klaus, B., Storcken, T., 2002. Choice correspondences for public goods. Social Choice and Welfare 19, 127–154.
Maskin, E., 1999. Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Review of Economic Studies 66, 23–38.
Miyagawa, E., 2001. House allocation with transfers. Journal of Economic Theory 100, 329–355.
Moulin, H.,1990.Fairdivisionunderjointownership:recentresultsandopenproblems.SocialChoiceandWelfare7,149–170.
Muller, E., Satterthwaite, M., 1977. On the equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness. Journal of
Economic Theory 14, 412–418.
Nehring, K., 2000. Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences. Social Choice and Welfare
17, 367–375.
Ohseto, S., 1999. Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good. Social Choice and
Welfare 16, 121–136.
Ohseto, S., 2000. Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains.
International Journal of Game Theory 29, 365–374.
Ohseto, S., 2004. Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains. Economic
Theory 23, 659–670.
Ohseto, S., 2006. Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods. Economic
Theory 29, 111–121.
Pattanaik, P.K., 1973. On the stability of sincere voting situations. Journal of Economic Theory 6, 558–574.
Pattanaik, P.K., 1974. Stability of sincere voting under some classes of non-binary group decision procedures. Journal of
Economic Theory 8, 206–224.
Pazner, E., Schmeidler, D., 1978. Egalitarian equivalent allocations: a new concept of economic equity. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 92, 671–683.
Satterthwaite, M.A., 1975. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting
procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory 10, 187–217.
Schummer,J.,2000.Elicitingpreferencestoassignpositionsandcompensation.GamesandEconomicBehavior30,293–318.
Svensson, L.-G., 1983. Large indivisibilities: an analysis with respect to price equilibrium and fairness. Econometrica 51,
939–954.
Svensson, L.-G., Larsson, B., 2002. Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money. Economic
Theory 20, 483–502.
Tadenuma, K., Thomson, W., 1991. No-envy and consistency in economies with indivisible goods. Econometrica 59,
1755–1767.
Tadenuma, K., Thomson, W., 1993. The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible.
Mathematical Social Sciences 25, 117–132.
Tadenuma, K., Thomson, W., 1995. Games of fair division. Games and Economic Behavior 9, 191–204.
Thomson, W., 1979. Maximin strategies and elicitation of preferences. In: Laffont, J.-J. (Ed.), Aggregation and Revealed
Preferences. North Holland Publishing Company, pp. 245–268.
Thomson, W., 2004. Theory of Fair Allocation. Mimeo, University of Rochester.
68 O. Bochet, T. Sakai / Mathematical Social Sciences 53 (2007) 53–68